

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10132

20 November 1981

# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 28/81)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10132

20 November 1981

USSR REPORT  
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS  
(FOUO 28/81)

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL

- Lasting Effects of Maoism in CCP, Anti-Soviet Course of PRC Analyzed  
(Viktor Borisovich Laptev; VOPROSY ISTORII, Jul 81) ..... 1

REGIONAL

- Ideological-Moral Education Problems in Estonia  
(Elsa Grechkina; NOUKOGUDE KOOL, No 7, 1981) ..... 15

- a -

[III - USSR - 35 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTERNATIONAL

LASTING EFFECTS OF MAOISM IN CCP, ANTI-SOVIET COURSE OF PRC ANALYZED

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 7, Jul 81 pp 59-73

[Article by Viktor Borisovich Laptev, graduate student at the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specializing in the history of international relations in the Far East: "Petty-Bourgeois Tendencies in the CCP and the Shaping of Beijing's Anti-Soviet Policy"]

[Excerpts] For many years now, anti-Sovietism has been elevated to the rank of state policy in China. Beijing leaders, while mouthing their adherence to the ideals of communism, have in practice conducted a policy profoundly hostile to the cause of socialism, both within the country and in the world arena, and have aimed the cutting edge of their subversive policy at the primary force of the world socialist system, the Soviet Union. This circumstance has necessitated thorough study of the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its shift from revolutionary, progressive positions to cooperation with the imperialist states and to conducting a great-power, hegemonistic, anti-Soviet policy.<sup>1</sup> Marxist researchers are introducing into scientific circulation ever more material and facts on the events which have been of great importance to the destinies of the Chinese Communist Party, to shaping its political course. Their attention continues to be drawn to the personality of Mao Zedong and his activity in the CCP which was destructive to the cause of socialism in China. Considerable factual material is contained in O. Braun's book "Kitayskiye zapiski" [Notes From China], (Moscow, 1974), in Wang Ming's work "Polveka KPK i predatel'stvo Mao Tszeduna" [Half A Century of the CCP and the Treachery of Mao Zedong], (Moscow, 1979) and in the book "Osobyi rayon Kitaya" [A Special Region of China], (Moscow, 1974), by P. P. Vladimirov, Comintern liaison to the CCP Central Committee and TASS

-----  
<sup>1</sup>"Opasnyy kurs" [Dangerous Course], collection of articles, Nos 1-10, Moscow, 1969-1980; A. Ye. Bovin and L. P. Delyusin, "Politicheskiy krizis v Kitaye. Sobytiya i prichiny" [Political Crisis in China. Events and Causes], Moscow, 1968; O. Borisov, "Sovetskiy Soyuz i Man'chzhurskaya revolyutsionnaya baza (1945-1949)" [The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base (1945-1949)], Moscow, 1975; S. L. Tikhvinskiy, "Istoriya Kitaya i sovremennost'" [History of China and the Present], Moscow, 1976; V. A. Krivtsov, "Maoizm: istoki i sushchnost'" [Maoism: Sources and Essence], Moscow, 1976; O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya, 1945-1977" [Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1977], 2nd edition, expanded, Moscow, 1977; M. I. Sladkovskiy, "Kitay: osnovnyye problemy istorii, ekonomiki, ideologii" [China: Basic Problems of History, Economy, Ideology], Moscow, 1978; M. S. Kapitsa, "KNR: tri desyatiletia -- tri politiki" [The PRC: Three Decades, Three Policies], Moscow, 1979.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

military correspondent in Yanang (from May 1942 through November 1945). Books by F. Burlatskiy, "Mao Tszedun" [Mao Zedong], (Moscow, 1970), "Mao Tszedun i ego nasledniki" [Mao Zedong and His Successors], (Moscow, 1979) and a work by O. Ye. Vladimirov and V. I. Ryazantsev, "Stranitsy politicheskoy biografii Mao Tszedun" [Pages From the Political Biography of Mao Zedong], (Moscow, 1980), made a substantial contribution to unmasking the antiparty and anti-Soviet activity of Mao Zedong and his allies by demonstrating that, throughout his CCP activity, Mao Zedong always, secretly or openly, advocated nationalistic positions, waged a persistent struggle against the internationalist wing of the party, propagated his own authority in every way possible and was an intransigent enemy of Marxist-Leninist teachings. This article examines the reasons for the development of petty-bourgeois, nationalistic tendencies in the Chinese Communist Party and the spread of Maoism in it.

The overall socioeconomic backwardness of China predetermined in considerable measure the difficulties and conflicts in establishing the CCP. The very conditions under which the Chinese Communist Party was formed favored the activity within its ranks of elements alienated by class to the cause of proletarian revolution and the spread in the party of their petty-bourgeois, nationalistic concepts. This kind of theory could have arisen and existed only under conditions of isolation of the broad masses of the party from the experience of building socialism in the USSR and other socialist countries, as a result of shameless falsification of Marxist-Leninist teachings and the substitution of home-grown, petty-bourgeois, nationalistic ideas for them. Hence, the enmity of Mao Zedong to the Soviet Union and the CPSU. The fruitlessness of Maoist theories and their failure on contact with real life were also predetermined by the methods Mao Zedong used to propagate his views. Inside the country, they included the pursuit of all manner of heterodoxies and slander against the Soviet Union, the CPSU and other communist parties. In foreign policy, they meant a bitter struggle against the USSR and a policy of hegemony in relations with other states.

At the start of this century, China was a backward, agrarian country. In spite of the fact that the development of a capitalist method of production had been accelerating the breakdown of feudalism in the country since the late 19th Century, its survivals were very strong, especially in rural areas. Machine industry, belonging generally to foreign capital, was concentrated in a few large cities. Small, primitive enterprises predominated in industry, by and large. The class structure of Chinese society reflected the undeveloped, backward nature of the country's productive forces. The classes and social strata of a precapitalist and transition-to-capitalism type comprised the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population, at least 90 percent of whom lived in rural areas. The peasantry, the bulk of whom were landless and forced to rent land on cabalistic terms from landowners and kulaks, was doomed to poverty. The working class had just begun taking shape. A majority of the workers, recently arrived from the countryside, were employed at unskilled manual labor.

In view of this concrete-historical circumstance, V. I. Lenin thought China needed first of all to eliminate feudal survivals, at that stage of its development. Lenin wrote that the working class of China was not yet a force capable of leading a revolutionary movement in the country.

The overthrow of the feudal-monarchic society as a result of the 1911-1913 Xinhai revolution helped strengthen the positions of the Chinese national bourgeoisie. In the first stage of the revolution, the bourgeoisie promoted general democratic slogans and, in an alliance with other anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces, dominated the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

national-liberation and revolutionary movement of China. Lenin stressed the progressive role of the leading portion of the Chinese bourgeois and its ability to facilitate the process of democratic transformations in the country.

The victorious October Revolution and the successful actualization of Marxist-Leninist teachings in the course of the three Russian revolutions made a profound impression on the democratic forces of China, which immediately attempted to establish ties with Soviet Russia.

Lenin viewed the national-liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries as an ally of the world proletariat.

Soviet Russia and the Comintern, in performance of their international duty, rendered the Chinese revolutionary and national-liberation movement broad, comprehensive assistance. The 1919 RSFSR Council of People's Commissariats appeal "To the Chinese People and the Governments of South and North China," in which the Soviet government rescinded all the agreements of Tsarist Russia which infringed on China's interests and proposed the establishment of equal, friendly relations between Soviet Russia and China,<sup>1</sup> was an action of great political importance, which strengthened the faith of the Chinese people in the revolutionary ideals of a socialist revolution in Russia.

In the 1920's, China was able to obtain the political, economic and military assistance it needed in the struggle against imperialism and its proteges only from the Soviet state. The establishment of ties between Soviet Russia and the Chinese revolutionary movement and the activity of the first Chinese Marxists, Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo, Zhang Tailei and others, helped familiarize Chinese revolutionaries with Marxist-Leninist teachings and the experience of the October Revolution. The 1st (constituent) CCP Congress was held on the outskirts of Shanghai in the summer of 1921. Party strategy and tactics were worked out at subsequent congresses, the 2nd (1922) and 3rd (1923). Direct, active assistance on the part of the Comintern played a most important role in the theoretical establishment of the CCP.

The close contacts between Chinese communists and the Comintern and studying the experience of the international working class were especially needed in connection with the fact that the Chinese Communist Party was born in a country with weak, newly evolving proletarian traditions. The great enthusiasm for Marxism generated by the October Revolution carried with it a danger of simplified understanding of the fundamental concepts of Marxist-Leninist teachings, emasculation of its class content, accommodation and an eclectic combination of them and the petty-bourgeois views of a majority of the leaders of and participants in the national-liberation movement in China. The use by representatives of nonproletarian strata of society of Marxist phraseology to conceal their own goals, remote from the interests of the working class, seriously damaged the revolutionary struggle of the working class as well.

The unification of the working class in the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution, with all its anti-feudal, anti-imperialist forces, did not signify that the special, class interests of the proletariat dissolved in that movement.

Relying on the international support of the international communist and workers' movement and using the favorable factors of Chinese domestic-policy development, the

<sup>1</sup>"Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Documents of USSR Foreign Policy], Vol 2, Moscow, 1958, p 223.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CCP grew into a significant force in the initial years of its existence. By the start of 1927, its ranks numbered about 58,000 people, including 50.8 percent workers, 18.7 percent peasants, 19.1 percent representatives of the intelligentsia, 3.1 percent soldiers and officers and 0.5 percent petty tradesmen.<sup>1</sup> The counter-revolutionary overturn of 1927 by the reactionary forces of China and the defeat of the 1925-1927 revolution had a serious effect on the destinies of the communist party. A majority of the best-prepared CCP activists most dedicated to the cause of socialist revolution, among them Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo and Zhang Tailei, perished as a result of strikes by that reaction. The proletariat suffered heavy losses, especially in the two largest revolutionary centers of China, Guangzhou and Shanghai. The communist party shifted its activity from the cities to remote rural regions and operated isolated from the working class and the international communist and workers' movement over the next two decades.

Under these complex conditions, the organizational, political and ideological miscalculations of the young communist party were manifested with particular sharpness. From the moment of its formation, features were inherent to it which, in the absence of systematic work by the leadership for ideological and class purity in its ranks, threatened to grow into a serious danger to the ideological-political integrity of the party and be transformed into a factor operating along the line of converting the CCP into a petty-bourgeois party defending positions having nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. This was stated, in particular, in the resolution by the CCP Central Committee Plenum convened in November 1927: "Nearly the entire leadership of our party consists not of workers, or even of the poorest peasants, but of representatives of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia." The reasons, as was pointed out in the resolution, were that the "CCP began evolving as a political current and as a party back when the Chinese proletariat was not yet self-determining as a class and when the class movement of workers and peasants was quite embryonic. Development of the national-liberation movement, in which the bourgeoisie, and especially the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, initially played an enormous role, long determined growth in the class consciousness and class struggle of the exploited masses in China. In this period, the most radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie sought to join the ranks of our party, occupying the left-most wing of the national-liberation movement front. These elements also comprised the initial nucleus of the Chinese Communist Party."<sup>2</sup>

The plenum resolution directly stated the dangerous consequences of such a situation: "Due to this, the leadership role in the CCP has remained with those from the petty-bourgeois strata. Uplifted by the wave of revolutionary upsurge and enthusiasm of the initial period, not having passed through the theoretical school of Marxism and Leninism, unfamiliar with the experience of the international proletarian movement, not linked to the lower, exploited classes of the Chinese people and outside the class struggle of the workers and peasants, a significant portion of these revolutionary petty-bourgeois elements have not only not been digested in the CCP, have not been remade into consistent proletarian revolutionaries, but have themselves

-----  
<sup>1</sup>"Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya. 1917-1970 gg." [Newest History of China. 1917-1970], Moscow, 1972, p 108.

<sup>2</sup>Quoted from: O. Vladimirov and V. Ryazantsev, Op. cit., p 20.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

introduced into the CCP all the political instability, inconsistency, indecisiveness, inability to organize, nonproletarian customs and traditions, prejudices and illusions of which only a petty-bourgeois revolutionary is capable."<sup>1</sup>

The negative phenomena in CCP activity indicated in the resolution were not overcome, and intensified even more in subsequent years. In the 1930's and 1940's, party ranks were reinforced almost exclusively by people leaving rural areas. CCP leaders' rejection of Leninist demands in question of party development, including admissions to the party, had far-reaching consequences. Campaigns to enlist in it representatives of the most diverse social strata, including those from the exploiter classes, on a broad scale were widespread. In rural areas, where the downtroddenness and backwardness of the peasants represented serious difficulties in broadening the mass base of the party, admission to the party was often combined with the distribution of land among the peasants. The unprincipled, forced increase in CCP membership led to a situation in which it increased from 40,000 in 1937 to 800,000 in 1940. Up to 90 percent of the party members were now peasants, and only 4-6 percent were workers, primarily in small trade or handicraft shops.<sup>2</sup> In the cities, the CCP generally admitted representatives of the intelligentsia and petty-bourgeois strata during that period.

Thus, the CCP was transformed into a peasant, petty-bourgeois party in terms of its social composition. This could not but cause the spread of petty-bourgeois ideology reflecting the interests of the bulk of the nonproletarian elements comprising the main contingent of party members within its ranks.

The activity of Mao Zedong in the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party was destructive to its cause. From a kulak family and, by his own admission, without any sort of integrated revolutionary vision, he viewed revolution, as did many leaders of peasant movements in feudal China, as a chance to gain the highest power and fully subordinated his activity in the CCP to this goal. Mao Zedong revealed himself to be a very experienced politician for whom an irrepressible thirst for power, inordinate ambition, lack of principle and stubbornness in actualizing his schemes were characteristic. In the 1930's and 1940's, when the Chinese Communist Party operated in the remote, obscure regions of the country, Mao Zedong was able, through intrigue and unprincipled intraparty maneuvering, not stopping at the destruction of his political enemies, to grasp a leadership position in the CCP.

The CCP social composition which evolved during that period suited Mao Zedong fully, as it was close to his own views on the tasks and goals of the Chinese revolution. The interests and goals for which the Chinese working class was fighting were foreign to petty-bourgeois revolutionary Mao Zedong. Hence the indifference to social criteria for admission to the party. The primary thing was the unquestioning adherence of party members to his instructions. Mao Zedong even encouraged strengthening the CCP by adding various nonproletarian elements.

In his struggle for power, Mao Zedong viewed Marxism-Leninism from the very start as the primary obstacle to actualizing his own plans. He saw binding the party to his own ideological concepts and substituting Maoism for Marxism-Leninism as the

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp 20-21.

<sup>2</sup>"Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya. 1917-1970 gg.," p 192.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

theoretical foundation of the party as an indispensable condition for securing his own power in the CCP. Mao Zedong's views were reflected in the New Democratic Revolution theory he advanced in 1940, which was presented in expanded form at the 7th CCP Congress. Mao Zedong advanced as a minimum program the idea that it was necessary to have an "alliance of several democratic classes," the development of a private-capital economy -- "we have too little capitalism" -- over a long historical period, thus granting a broad field of activity to the bourgeoisie. The "new democratic state" concept essentially denied the possibility of changing over to building socialism after the victory of a popular revolution.<sup>1</sup>

In 1941-1945, Mao Zedong managed to organize and wage a campaign for "proper style" ("zhengfeng"), in the course of which he discredited the experience of building socialism in the USSR and the activity and recommendations of the Comintern and the All-Russian Communist Party (bol'shevik). At the same time, Maoists defamed and repressed internationalists. Mao Zedong's assistants destroyed thousands of Chinese communists. As a result, Mao Zedong succeeded in breaking the resistance of the international wing of the party to his own political course, to crush other party leaders and work in his own ideological-political aims.

To his own ends, Mao Zedong inculcated the party ranks with the most reactionary prejudices, especially those characteristic of the backward country China was. At one time, Lenin warned that "the more backward a country is, the stronger small-scale farming, patriarchy and provinciality are in it, inevitably leading to special strength and persistence of the most deep-seated of the petty-bourgeois prejudices, to be precise, those of national egoism and national narrow-mindedness."<sup>2</sup> In 1944, in a conversation with Wang Ming, one of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party during those years, Mao Zedong declared directly that the purpose of the "proper style" campaign was to make it possible to record the history of the Chinese Communist Party as his personal history.<sup>3</sup> The historical facts were known to many, however, so Mao Zedong did everything he could to propagate his own interpretation of the history of the Chinese revolution.

Thus, even in those years, Mao Zedong was working actively to incite anti-Sovietism in party ranks, to divorce and isolate the CCP from the international communist and workers' movement. In so doing, the party was deprived of life-giving sources of international experience and assistance on the part of the fraternal parties, which is so necessary for its correct development. The most important Leninist principle, that the young parties of the East must maintain the very closest ties with the world communist and workers' movement, "merging with the proletariats of other countries in common struggle,"<sup>4</sup> was violated. The 7th CCP Congress was held in this atmosphere in April-June 1945. It summed up many years of intraparty struggle. Maoists succeeded in gaining the upper hand over the internationalist wing of the party and propagating their own right-opportunistic, nationalistic platform.

<sup>1</sup>Mao Zedong, "Izbr. proizv." [Selected Works], Vol 4, Moscow, 1953, pp 501-513.

<sup>2</sup>V. I. Lenin, "PSS" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 168.

<sup>3</sup>Wang Ming, Op. cit., p 63.

<sup>4</sup>V. I. Lenin, "PSS," Vol 39, p 330.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Soviet Union's entry into the war in the Far East and the defeat by Soviet troops of the millions-strong Japanese Kwangtung army fundamentally altered the military-political situation in China. Thanks to Soviet assistance, the CCP was able to organize a revolutionary base in the country's northeast where well-armed units of the people's army were formed, later to play an important role in the defeat of the Kuomintang armies. The extensive political, military and economic assistance on the part of the USSR during the popular-liberation war facilitated the victory of the Chinese revolution. The People's Republic of China (PRC) was formed on 1 October 1949.

The Soviet-Chinese "Agreement on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid" signed in Moscow on 14 February 1950 was of great importance to the further development of relations between the USSR and the PRC. The enormous contribution by the Soviet Union to the cause of victory and continued development of the Chinese revolution and its assistance in building the new society objectively facilitated growth in the prestige and influence of Soviet experience in party and economic development among the broad masses in the party and PRC cadre workers. Concrete experience in building socialism, which developed in China in spite of the schemes and theoretical constructs of Mao Zedong and his allies, naturally led Chinese communists to an understanding of the hostility of Maoist concepts on developing the country to the interests of the Chinese people and the cause of socialism. The positions of internationalists in the CCP began to be strengthened.

One reflection of these processes was certainly the 8th CCP Congress, held in September 1956. Several negative factors of intraparty life and mistakes permitted in the course of building socialism were criticized at the congress. However, the new central committee included practically all the central committee members elected by the 7th Party Congress, which could not but have an effect on implementation of the resolutions worked out at the 8th Congress.

The inconsistency of the struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism is to be explained in considerable measure by the fact that, after the victory of the revolution, the social composition of the CCP facilitated dissemination of the petty-bourgeois concepts of Mao Zedong. In spite of some growth in the worker stratum of the party (from 6.5 percent in May 1953 to 14 percent by 1956), it remained essentially peasant: by 1956, some 69 percent of its members were peasants and 12 percent were of the intelligentsia.<sup>1</sup>

The successes in building socialism in China in the early 1950's generated in Mao Zedong and his allies the revolutionary illusion inherent to the petty bourgeois that it would be possible to accelerate the development of China along a path of transforming it into a powerful state with a modern military-industrial potential. Not understanding the patterns of economic development under socialism, Mao Zedong completely ignored the law of planned, proportional development. Due to the ideological and political immaturity of the broad party masses, Mao Zedong succeeded in foisting on the party the aims of forcing socialist transformations initially intended to take three five-year plans. The villages were made cooperative and private-capital industry and trade were transformed in 1955-1956. However, after the congress which affirmed the aim of planned development of the Chinese economy, Maoists succeeded in diverting the party from that course and undertaking on a nation-

<sup>1</sup>"Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya. 1917-1970 gg.," pp 256, 286.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

wide scale an attempt to achieve in a very brief period a sharp increase in the level of industrial and agricultural production. The total lack of conformity of forms and methods and rates of development of the Chinese economy as thrust upon it by Mao Zedong to the objective socioeconomic conditions of China led to the collapse of the "Great Leap" policy and to a serious crisis in the Chinese economy. Mao Zedong's ambitious plans to make China one of the strongest world powers in a single spurt were crushed.

Having suffered defeat in the economic sphere, Mao Zedong embarked on implementation of his great-power plans in the area of foreign policy. "We must subjugate the whole globe" was how Mao formulated the goal of Maoists in the world arena at a meeting of the CCP Central Committee Military Council in 1959.<sup>1</sup> Making out his hegemonist strivings to be a manifestation of class struggle in international relations, they counted on foisting their adventuristic policy on the world communist and workers' movement, and foremost on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, in order to use their military and economic potential. At a Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957, Mao Zedong proposed: "Let's first test our strength, and then return to building."<sup>2</sup> However, the attempt to subordinate the socialist countries and the world communist movement to the aims of the Maoists was not successful. In this regard, the actions of the Maoists revealed their theoretical helplessness, reactionariness and the adventuristic nature of the PRC foreign policy course. Subsequently, Maoist policy aimed at splitting the international communist and workers' movement and extending their influence to the national liberation movement unavoidably led them to international isolation, to undermining trust in the PRC, inasmuch as it was completely contradictory to the interests of peoples desiring peace and to ensuring conditions for creative labor.

Intensified anti-Sovietism became a characteristic feature of the Maoist foreign policy course after the 8th CCP Congress. The activity of Mao Zedong and his allies was always accompanied by attacks on Marxism-Leninism under the banner of its supposed "obsolescence" and "nonconformity to Chinese conditions." Maoist theories of "Chinkized Marxism" were proposed to replace them. Since the late 1950's, the Soviet experience in building socialism has been subjected to increasingly harsh attacks. The campaign of refuting everything Soviet took on especially broad scope during the "Great Leap" period. Under slogans of combatting "dogmatism" and "blind worship of authorities," "local," "Chinese" methods conflicting with the objective trends of social development were propagated. Such methods could be used only under conditions of a premeditated distortion of the essence of Marxist-Leninist teachings, of isolation of the broad masses of the party from the experience of party and state development in the USSR and other socialist countries. In the case of China, continued cooperation with the Soviet Union signified the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist teachings in the party and among the working masses, strengthening the influence of the internationalist wing of the CCP and a gradual eradication of Maoist ideology from the social life of the country. In pursuit of their own hegemonistic, great-power goals, which differed profoundly from the interests of the Chinese people, the Maoists were allied to the Soviet Union by force and only due to the circumstances which had evolved and counting on assistance needed to strengthen their own regime.

<sup>1</sup>Quoted from: V. F. Feoktistov, "Maoism and the Fate of Socialism in China," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, No 3, 1979, p 145.

<sup>2</sup>Quoted from: "Vneshnyaya politika KNR" [PRC Foreign Policy], Moscow, 1971, p 31.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The defeats in PRC domestic and foreign policy which followed after Mao Zedong had succeeded in foisting on the CCP his recipes for socioeconomic development of the country and his foreign-policy aims occurred on a background of successful development of the world socialist system, foremost in the Soviet Union. This turn of events posed a mortal danger to Maoism as an ideological current and cast doubt on the authority of Mao Zedong, leading to the unavoidable loss of the leading positions at his disposal in the party and state. As a consequence, Mao's retention and solidification of his personal power and implementation of the goals set resulted in his irreconcilable struggle against the primary ally of healthy forces within the CCP, the CPSU and foreign Marxist-Leninist parties and the world socialist system, and foremost against the Soviet Union.

This struggle was made easier for Maoists by the fact that for many years, Chinese communists had been subjected to ideological development in a spirit of the ideas of Mao. The cult of his personality fettered creative forces in the party and braked the spread of Marxism-Leninism among CCP members. The party and state leadership was comprised basically of people put forward by Mao himself, people sharing his views or subordinate to his diktat. The slandering, intimidation and inciting of some members of the leadership against others was widely practiced by Mao Zedong for the purpose of strengthening his power and discrediting political opponents. Under these conditions, Mao succeeded in systematically and effectively attacking Marxist-Leninist forces in the party, in eliminating the most prominent CCP activists and consistent internationalists, blaming them for "anti-party" activity and pinning various labels on them. Thus, CCP Central Committee Politburo members Gao Gang and Pien Diehuai and Politburo candidate member Zhang Wentian and others were removed from the CCP leadership and repressed in the 1950's.

The inability of Maoism to ensure the systematic development of Chinese society, and especially the scandalous economic defeats when the party followed Mao Zedong's recommendations, the dissatisfaction of the broad masses of people with the deterioration in their material situation caused an exacerbation of the CCP intraparty struggle in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Quite a broad, but diverse, opposition developed in the party, including such officials as PRC Chairman Liu Shaoqi and others. The opposition condemned the most adventuristic actions of Mao Zedong and his allies within the country and abroad, in fear of deadly consequences for the Chinese state. Neither did it approve the complete break in CPR relations with the socialist countries. However, the inability of the opposition to overcome the cult of Mao and to fully reject the ideology of Maoism hampered the unification of anti-Maoist forces and did not permit an open, principled struggle to eliminate Mao from the political scene.

The inconsistency of and conflict within the opposition enabled Mao Zedong and his allies to prepare to shift to the counterattack. During the so-called "cultural revolution" developed by Maoists in 1966-1969, which relied on army support and used as a strike force young students and backward strata of the working class, Mao's group broke the resistance of his opponents in the party and state apparatus and actually accomplished a state revolution. Party and state organs were broken up and a majority of the cadre workers were repressed. Zhou Enlai admitted in a conversation with E. Snow that 70-80 percent of the party-state cadres "lost their posts in the 'cultural revolution' and were sent to 7 May schools."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>"Kitay posle "kul'turnoy revolyutsii" (politicheskaya sistema, vnutripoliticheskoye polozheniye)" [China After the "Cultural Revolution" (Political System, Domestic Policy Situation)], Moscow, 1979, p 25.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Maoists now had an opportunity to carry out their own domestic and foreign policies by creating their own party.

On the whole, although Maoists did succeed in eliminating their political opponents and achieving undivided dominion in China, the "cultural revolution" demonstrated the growing conflict between the objective demands of developing Chinese society and Maoist domestic and foreign policy. The conflict essentially between the antisocialist superstructure and the socialist base of Chinese society resulted in political instability in the country, instability of the Maoist regime, and predetermined the rise of new crisis situations in the economy and in the social and political life of China. After the 9th CCP Congress held in April 1969, Maoists attempted by socio-political maneuvering to neutralize the most negative consequences of implementing Mao Zedong's ideas within the country and abroad. However, palliative resolutions could not soften in any substantial way the development of crisis trends in Chinese society. The inability of Maoists to propose to their people a constructive program for transforming the country resulted from their lack of a political platform on which to base the unification of Chinese society.

This situation led to the rise within the Maoist bloc of groupings reflecting various trends in the sociopolitical development of China within the framework of an eclectic, internally contradictory Maoist teaching. By supporting particular groupings, Mao Zedong availed himself of a definite opportunity to direct the policies of the country.

The strongest grouping was that of PRC Minister of Defense Lin Biao, which is to be explained by the role the army had acquired as a result of the "cultural revolution." At the 9th CCP Congress, Lin Biao became the sole Deputy Chairman of the CCP and Mao's official successor. The very existence of such a grouping represented a threat to Mao Zedong. In this regard, by expressing the specific interests of his own grouping, Lin Biao was negatively inclined towards normalizing relations with the USA and continued to insist on a policy of "equal-standing" relative to the USSR and USA. While a dangerous contestant for other pretenders to the highest power in Beijing, Lin Biao was at the same time an obstacle to reorienting the PRC towards cooperation with Western countries, and foremost the United States.

Another influential grouping which evolved during the "cultural revolution" period were the leaders of the hongweibin and zaofang, the so-called leftists, who carried out Mao's policies and who were his most consistent allies. They gained especially solid positions in the CCP propaganda apparatus and the mass media. However, the primary advantage of this grouping was that it was under the patronage of Mao himself, that in time, it would come to replace him. This grouping, whose most prominent representatives were Jian Qing, Kang Sheng, Zhang Zhongqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, was especially suspicious of the military, viewing it as its main competitors in the struggle for power.

The complete failure of Maoist aims to conform to the needs of China's socioeconomic development, by generating a permanent crisis situation in the economy and in society, forced several officials in the Beijing upper echelons to seek out more efficient methods of managing the country. These searches were to a certain extent a return to the forms and methods used in the 1950's, when China made extensive use of Soviet experience in building socialism, and they reflected an effort to soften the impact on the economy of promoters of the "cultural revolution," who completely

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ignored the objective laws of development of the national economic complex and had pinned their hopes entirely on voluntaristic method of management. At the same time, the "pragmatists" did not go beyond Maoist concepts of transforming China into a powerful militarized state and fully shared the anti-Soviet, great-power, hegemonistic policy established in PRC foreign policy.

Recognizing the impossibility of the isolated development of the Chinese economy, the "pragmatists" attempted to establish broad trade and economic ties with the capitalist world. The process of reorienting China's foreign economic ties towards capitalist countries which occurred beginning in the early 1960's also underpinned to a certain extent the economic basis of and change in the foreign policy course of the PRC. The right-opportunistic, petty-bourgeois tendencies which had always been strong in the CCP and which had been advanced by Mao Zedong back in the 1940's as part of his "new democratism" found further development in the activity of the "pragmatists," represented in the highest echelon of the Chinese hierarchy by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and other officials.

The direction in which China's politics evolved is clearly revealed in the policy of rapprochement with the USA. It was divulged at the 2nd Plenum of the Ninth Convocation of the CCP Central Committee in August 1970 that secret talks had been held with the USA under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai beginning back in 1955. Rapprochement with the USA signified essentially a rejection of one of the basic Maoist doctrines, that of struggle "against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism." Lin Biao's speeches before and after the 2nd Plenum testified to the fact that he insisted on the necessity of waging the struggle on two fronts, considering the struggle against American imperialism to have priority. This position put Lin Biao's grouping in conflict with all the main factions in the Beijing leadership and predestined its fall. The elimination of Lin Biao as a result of the 1971 "September events" did much to open up the way for rapprochement between the PRC and USA, which objectively facilitated an intensification of anti-Sovietism in China's policies.

As a result of the elimination of Lian [sic] Biao's grouping in the CCP, the positions of the "pragmatists" were strengthened, having gradually established their views on solutions of the economic and foreign-policy problems of the Chinese state. In the subsequent period, the struggle for power developed between this grouping and the "left-Maoist" faction supporting Mao and standing for continuing the implementation of the obsolete Maoist domestic and foreign policy directives. The outcome of this struggle was in the end decided by the fact that among the Chinese people and in the party and state cadre apparatus, the calamities which befell China as a result of the "cultural revolution" were directly associated in the public consciousness with the activity of the "left-Maoist" grouping. The death of Mao in September 1976 led to the rapid fall of the "Gang of Four" (Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chongqiao and Yao Wenyuan), thus considerably weakening the positions of other proponents of the "cultural revolution" as well.

The struggle between those who advanced the "cultural revolution" and those many CCP cadre workers who suffered from the Maoist purges was exacerbated in the new CCP leadership led by Hua Guofeng, one of those closest to Mao. As a result of the stubborn struggle within the Beijing hierarchy, the 5th CCP Central Committee Plenum of the 11th Convocation, which was held in February 1980, another foursome of "cultural revolution" proponents was relieved of party and government leadership posts -- CCP Central Committee Deputy Chairman Wang Dongxing and Politburo members Chen

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Xiliang, Wu De and Ji Dengkui. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, allies of Deng Xiaoping, were installed in the CCP Central Committee Politburo Permanent Committee at that same plenum. In this regard, Hu Yaobang was designated CCP Central Committee General Secretary. The positions of CCP Central Committee Chairman Hua Guofeng continued to weaken and, at the 3rd Session of the VSNP [All-China Assembly of National Representatives], held in September 1980, he was forced to abandon the post of PRC State Soviet Premier, which was assumed by Zhao Ziyang. The "Gang of Four" trial held in Beijing led to a further weakening of Hua Guofeng's positions. The shake-ups in the Chinese leadership have not, however, signified fundamental changes in Beijing policies. As before, Maoist concepts determine the nature of PRC domestic and, especially, foreign policy.

Colossal military expenditures and its departure from socialist methods of managing the economy have not enabled China to make up the loss to its economy caused by Maoist experiments and the "cultural revolution." It was for precisely this reason that nothing was said at the 3rd VSNP Session about the scheduled completion of the "readjustment period" proclaimed in 1979. According to the 1981 plan, there is to be a reduction in the rates of growth, and the levels of production of a number of very important types of output -- coal, steel, petroleum, tractors, automobiles -- are to be reduced or frozen. Under these conditions, China's leaders are attempting to strengthen the economy by attracting foreign capital and stimulating private-entrepreneurial activity. A favorable investment climate is being created to do this. Survivors of the Chinese bourgeoisie have been returned bank deposits confiscated during the "cultural revolution" and back interest has been paid on them. Preferential terms have been granted for foreign capital investment. The 3rd VSNP Session adopted a law that taxes on mixed enterprises (in which both Chinese and foreign capital participate) will be 20 percent less than in capitalist countries. The bourgeoisie has been permitted political activity, all manner of "meetings" and "encounters" with various "democratic parties and groups."<sup>1</sup>

The attempt to solve China's economic problems by attracting foreign capital and reviving the private sector correspond fully to the petty-bourgeois essence of the contemporary Chinese leadership and flow naturally from the petty-bourgeois tendencies which have won in the CCP. However, recent events in the area of economic relations with western states have shown that this path is by no means as promising as has been depicted by Beijing leaders. In view of the financial bankruptcy of the PRC, it has had to cancel many large orders by Western companies.

The foreign policy goals of Beijing leaders remain unchanged. The idea of world domination, of transforming China into a power capable of dictating its will to the world, has dominated the whole of PRC foreign policy and all the country's resources. Chinese hegemonists understand that strengthening the world socialist system, the policy of detente and strengthening the political and economic independence of the liberated states are obstacles to the actualization of their plans. Beijing is therefore attempting to brake, undermine and weaken these processes. To this end, it is conducting a hostile, subversive policy against the countries of the socialist community and their allies and is doing everything it can to exacerbate the international situation and to weaken progressive forces throughout the world.

The socialist community, led by the Soviet Union, is objectively the primary obstacle to actualization of the plans of Beijing leaders, inasmuch as these countries are

<sup>1</sup>PRAVDA, 11 September 1980, 28 January 1979.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

fighting most consistently against the expansionist strivings of the current Chinese leaders and are unmasking the reactionary character of any modifications of Maoism. Anti-Sovietism and anticommunism are therefore integral parts of the domestic and foreign political propaganda of the Beijing leadership. The PRC relies in its foreign policy on the most reactionary forces in the world, on those states conducting policies hostile to the cause of peace and social progress. The policy of rapprochement with capitalist countries, foremost the USA, and developing relations with various reactionary regimes also serves the foreign policy goals of Chinese leaders.

Chinese leaders are attempting to substantiate their forming a bloc with the capitalist countries, and foremost the USA, by relying on the myth of a "Soviet threat." The documents of the 9th (April 1969), 10th (August 1973) and 11th (August 1977) CCP Congresses evidence a clear trend towards shifting the direction of the main strike from the United States to the Soviet Union. The USSR is depicted as the more dangerous enemy, and the USA is made out to be more on the defensive. Chinese leaders attempt by this thesis to justify their own struggle, together with the imperialist countries, against the Soviet Union and their own policy of increasing their military might.

The 26th CPSU Congress confirmed the principles by which the CPSU and Soviet state are governed in relations with China in the current five-year period. As concerns the status and prospects of Soviet-Chinese relations, the Congress expressed a readiness to improve them on a base of proposals made previously. "If Soviet-Chinese relations remain frozen, the reason will not lie with us," declared L. I. Brezhnev at the congress. "The Soviet Union has not sought and is not seeking a confrontation with the People's Republic of China. We are following the course determined by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses and would like to build ties with it on a good-neighbor basis. Our proposals aimed at normalizing relations with China remain, as do our feelings of respect and friendship for the Chinese people."<sup>1</sup>

The main obstacle on the path of Chinese development remains Maoism. In spite of adjustments in individual postulates of it and criticism of certain "mistakes" permitted in actualizing the "thoughts of Mao Zedong," especially during the "cultural revolution," Maoism remains today the ideological-theoretical platform of the CCP. This situation is natural. For decades, Maoists waged a bitter struggle with Marxist-Leninist teaching and distorted it by limiting its spread among CCP members by every means available to them. For the bulk of its history, the CCP selected its members on the principle of their personal devotion to Mao Zedong and his ideas. As a result, the Maoists succeeded, by devastating the CCP during the "cultural revolution," in creating under that pretext their own party, which had nothing whatever in common with the ideals of communism. The existence of that party, uniting millions of people reared in a spirit of Maoist ideology, certainly ensured the materialization of the "thought of Mao Zedong" and their contemporary modifications in practical politics.

There exists a danger that the many years of Maoist speculation about Marxist-Leninist teachings and exploitation of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Chinese people has undermined the faith of working people in the ideas of socialism. The fact that the Chinese people's understanding of socialism was associated for more

-----  
<sup>1</sup>"Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 11.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

than 20 years with Maoist practice in the area of domestic and foreign policy will have a great impact on the fate of China. As a result, there arose in Chinese society an atmosphere favorable to the dissemination of illusions concerning the possibility of solving China's problems on a basis of concessions to the private sector of the economy and deals with capitalist states. The presence of strong petty-bourgeois and nationalistic tendencies in the CCP in the end created conditions favorable to reviving bourgeois ideology. Once again, the correctness of Lenin's warnings about the danger of petty-bourgeois elements has been confirmed: "Either we subordinate this petty bourgeoisie to our control and accounting (which we can do if we co-organize the poor, that is, the majority of the population of semiproletariat, around a conscious proletarian vanguard) or it will unavoidably and inevitably throw off our, worker, power, as the revolution of Napoleon and Cavaignac floundered on precisely this small property-holder soil and vegetation."<sup>1</sup> Maoism was unable to work out a positive program for developing the country and unifying the Chinese people to solve the problems facing them. Hence, the state of permanent crisis and the struggle of various factions in the CCP and PRC leadership.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Voprosy istorii", 1981

11052

CSO: 1807/168

---

<sup>1</sup>V. I. Lenin, "PSS," Vol 43, p 208.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

REGIONAL

IDEOLOGICAL-MORAL EDUCATION PROBLEMS IN ESTONIA

Tallinn NOUKOGUDE KOOL in Estonian No 7, 1981 pp 4-10

[Article by Elsa Grechkina: "Problems of Ideological-Moral Education in Light of Directives of the 26th Congress of the CPSU"]

[Text] As late as the 1950s the Soviet comprehensive educational school was primarily designed to prepare students for entry into higher and specialized mid-level schools. With this in mind the curricula had been composed, as had the number of hours for instruction of this or that subject, this characterized the content and character of work inside the school and outside it. In recent years, in connection with a change to mandatory mid-level education, the function of the school has changed considerably. The majority of graduates of the general school (considerably more than half in our republic) goes to work in the national economy--in industry, agriculture, services. For this reason it is necessary to improve even more the preparation of the youth for life and work in the interest of educating a comprehensively developed builder of communism, and to assure that all students acquire basic specialized skills and moral convictions. According to the new requirements the educating and training function of the schools will expand, as will the ideological function.

For the educators of the Estonian SSR and our entire country the last five-year plan period was a period of intensive work in fulfilling the requirements of the school-related documents of the 25th Congress of the CPSU as well as subsequent decisions of party and government. The most important of these consisted in establishing universal mandatory mid-level education, preparing students for real life, for work, and shaping a morally active attitude in each of them. From these perspectives we have to evaluate the results of our work.

As L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the transfer to a universal mandatory mid-level education has been accomplished throughout the USSR. This important milestone has been passed in our republic as well. At the end of the last school year 97.6 percent of the graduates of the 8th grade entered secondary schools. The acquisition of secondary education in the proper time frame increased (currently 99.1 percent as compared to 91.2 percent in 1976). The number of general education day school students increased by 7500 during the five-year period. More than 30,000 new student spaces were acquired. The schools implemented completely the departmental system, another 2000 instructional departments were established during the five-year period, the funds devoted to education increased compared to those of the Ninth Five-Year period. A large part of the funds came from sponsoring

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

institutions. The material basis of polytechnical instruction improved somewhat. A remarkable achievement in our republic consisted in the establishment of 5 inter-school study-productive facilities (we had none in the Ninth Five-Year Plan).

In the Estonian SSR great attention is paid to a further democratization and humanization of the contents of education. This is exemplified by the establishment of favorable conditions for children with mental and physical deficiencies. The number of schools for the handicapped is 46, sufficient for the needs.

The participation in all-day groups and classes increased by more than 10,000 students, reaching a total of 40,000. This is a contribution of the Soviet state toward the social education of the children. Great attention was paid to the need to completely adapt the new contents of education to the forms, means and methods of schoolwork, i.e. to buttress the pedagogical process scientifically-methodologically and ideologically. The first summaries of the current school year, the results of the first final examinations indicate that our schools, our teachers are training educated, morally active youths. We must appreciate that the most immediate aid to the schools in their task of preparing the rising generation for life comes from the Central Committee of the Estonian CP, and the party's town and rayon committees. At practically every meeting of the Central Committee of the Estonian CP, regardless of the problems under discussion, great attention is paid to the various activities of the schools, to their ties with life, to the concrete socio-economic and ideological-educational training. A persuasive example is the recent 2d Plenary Meeting of the CPEs Central Committee, where personnel questions were discussed. The First Secretary of the CPEs, K. Vayno, devoted great attention to school problems, the realistic possibilities of social practice, and outlined the tasks of party committees and educational institutions in light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Similarly, the party's town and rayon committees, taking into account the serious attention of the CPEs Central Committee to school problems, have focused their attention on educational problems. During the last 3-4 years many party committees at their plenary meetings and in their bureaus have taken a look at the substantive problems of schoolwork, the complex and promising plans for educational development proven in our practice as well as the course of fulfilling these plans. The party and soviet organs concentrate on sponsorship agreements between schools and enterprises. The structure and contents of the agreements were compiled by the Ministry of Education of the Estonian SSR. They were based on a comprehensive approach to education (a common front of school, home, work collective and the general public to organize a common unified pedagogical process to prepare children for life).

During the last school year the Estonian SSR's Ministry of Education made comprehensive observations about the educational work of each rayon and town during the 10th Five-Year Plan. Party committee secretaries and deputy chairmen of the executive committees concerned with educational questions participated in the discussions. The main aim of this task was to specify the joint distribution of plans according to governmental tasks, taking into account the concrete tasks of the town or rayon in directing graduates of the 8th grade to further training and for establishing a network of secondary schools, for expanding the network of schools and preschool institutions; to identify problems regarding a better utilization of educational personnel and for their comprehensive training; to discuss problems of school and extra-school activity, to identify precisely common educational requirements in each sector of work; to identify precisely concrete facts that prevent the successful fulfillment of teaching tasks.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

After such a common analysis there was (and in places still is) a similar inspection of each school and sponsoring enterprise. Such work permits raising the standard of educational management in each segment, working out mutual understanding and a joint approach for solving concrete tasks, and formulating the party and state directions for the comprehensive development of the young generation:

As a parallel measure and in cooperation with personnel of VOT (Institute for Continuing Education of the Republic's Teachers) and PTUI (Institute for Scientific Research into Education) the activity of the educational department of each town and rayon was inspected with attention paid to the establishment of universal secondary education, establishment of a school network, and raising the qualifications of the professional personnel. The results were compiled at the ministerial meeting and they will be published in pamphlet form, to enable the educational departments and schools to take necessary directive steps at the August meetings for a decisive and more positive direction of work.

We are convinced that during the 11th Five-Year Plan our republic, just as the entire USSR, has taken steps to assure a marked improvement in the level of educational work. The tasks facing the schools are not simple ones. Let us quote L. I. Brezhnev's report: "The main task is now to raise the quality of teaching and professional and moral education in the school, to eradicate formalism in evaluating the results of the work of teachers and students, to strengthen in fact the ties between teaching and life, and to improve the student's preparation for socially useful work. The teacher, of course, plays a decisive part in this. We must not be stingy with attention to his work, living conditions and raising his qualifications. But at the same time requirements for his work increase. The quality of curricula and texts also must be improved. It is stated correctly that they are too complicated. This makes teaching more difficult and leads to an unjustified overburdening of the children. The Ministry of Education and the Academy of Pedagogics must immediately improve the situation.

The materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU stress that education mirrors the comprehensive development of a society and develops itself intensively as part of a common process, of a unified social organism. From here, as with all other expressions of life, /in boldface/ emanate the socially coordinated requirements levied on educational organs, pedagogical collectives, every teacher, every school, every social institution that in some way deals with the training of the young generation." /end boldface/

Let us outline some problems that arise from this thesis.

First. Let the discussion of the first cycle of the problem be based on the methodological approach of the 26th Congress--formalism must be decisively eradicated in evaluating the results of the work of the teacher, student, and school. An entire complex of quantitative (statistical) indicators has been compiled for evaluating the work of school and teacher, and we must continue to rely on it. The inclusion of the student body, the number of students graduating at the proper time from the 8th grade and the secondary school, even the qualitative indicators of success in studies mirror the work of the school, teacher, and student. Our task is to find organic ties between quantitative and qualitative aspects. Obviously, the key to the secret of this machinery is the concrete analysis of the practice, each numerical indicator has to express an emotional, social indicator. For example, in spite

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of many achievements the general educational school still does not teach each of its students well. This fact in turn results in an inadequate quality of the student's achievement, which in turn is an important reason for dropping out. Each year 1.4 percent of the students in grades 1-11, some 2500 total, drop out.

An evaluation of the results of an activity is always connected with the moral and emotional experiences of the evaluated. Many have tried their luck in evaluating the activity of schools and teachers. Here we experience concretely that the spectrum of the social expression of schools and education is exceptionally broad. We still cannot imagine it all--education as a factor of socio-economic progress, education as a factor in progressive personnel policy, etc, etc. As a result of this spectrum there is a natural interest in education and schools, there is a wish to evaluate their activity. That is good. But we cannot remain deaf to the ever-increasing negativism in these evaluations that influence the shaping of concepts of schools, teachers, and students. Here, we hold, we must eliminate the once-forged stereotypical concepts of education that have developed into a linear connection--a student's shortcomings are the fault of the teacher of the school. This is stated without a deeper analysis of the causes of the shortcomings, without taking into account the final tasks of the training and educational process as well as the factors and means of the entire educational complex--family, work collective, micro-environment. In other words, the decisions of the 26th congress require corrections to be made according to the social functions of the schools, taking into account the real contribution of the schools to the society, and offering effective aid to this contribution. Let us once again quote from the report of L. I. Brezhnev: "We must not be stingy with attention to his work, living conditions and raising his (the teacher's Ed.) qualifications. But at the same time requirements of his work increase." The above shows that the preparation of the young generation for work is the business of the school as well as the society as a whole. Perhaps one shouldn't talk of this in such a great detail, but facts indicate otherwise.

Our republic lags considerably behind the planned tasks and the level of the USSR even in the proper dissemination of 8-grade education. That figure was 95.2 percent of the Estonian SSR at the end of the Five Year Plan, being at the same time more than 97 percent in the USSR. Each percentage means the fate of hundreds and hundreds of students. This fact considerably impedes the integration of youths into this or that segment of the educational system, causes competition among them, makes the rejuvenation of the society's social structure more difficult. Another fact connected with this problem--in spite of improvement in training students for professions or vocations the number of graduates commencing work in fields they were trained for in school is 12-16 percent in our republic.

Thus the deficiencies in cooperation between schools and enterprises is beginning to exert a negative effect on the socio-professional self-determination of the young, on their preparation in finding their place in life. This problem is especially acute with rural 8-grade schools. There is an intensive urbanization of 8th grade graduates, in spite of incentives offered in the country. The economists and sociologists of our republic are currently busy investigating the complicated streams of migration inside and outside the republics. Directing migration according to the planned shifts in the national economy is largely dependent on the socio-professional attitude of the young, on their training for life. We, the educational personnel, are fully aware that the requirement of the 26th Congress of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the CPSU regarding the development of the professional training and career management of the student body requires that we, together with work collectives arrange for a more skilled and better transition of youths into the national economy, paying particular attention to the need of the young to have the correct professional and ideological-moral sense of value and orientation.

Of course, an important and decisive part in this task is played by the school, the teacher. The republic's Interdepartmental Council on Vocational Selection of the Youth, approved by the Central Committee of the ECP, the Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR, and the Council of Labor Unions has been attached to the Ministry of Education for the actual work. The ministry has developed many measures to enable the educational organs and the schools to successfully implement the governmental educational policy. The observation of the common efforts of the school, home, public, and enterprises to assure a sympathetic attitude, a correct party-line activity in the professional training and ideological-moral education of the youths is of particular importance.

We must come to the point that all interested systems abandon a consumerist attitude in the preparation of the youths for a socio-moral task and life. Unfortunately, there are still a few chiefs of production who express their attitude toward the schools literally in these terms: "We have free education, the state provides the necessary resources and workers, why am I needed?" But you are needed for the reason that the concentrated influence of all systems is needed in the harmonious development of a young person.

It is apparently a mistake to imagine that a young person could obtain everything that there is to know in a classroom. For his development he needs the rich spectrum of relationships of the entire society, where each system connected with the school has a specific function that must be realized by a direct relationship and contact with the young. We have some good experiences in this.

The task of further improving the ideological-moral training of the student body was served at a discussion of the school libraries and school museums held jointly with the Ministry of Culture of the Estonian SSR. There is reason to expect that as a result of such common efforts the respective work in all of our general educational schools will improve. We have traditional, good and meaningful contacts with the Minister of Culture, the cultural personnel of the republic, as well as with the creative leagues and their representatives. Within the framework of the theatre month, the children's music week, at the art week staged in many towns and rayons of the republic there have always been warm and useful meetings of the school students and the representatives of the arts and culture. Of course, all opportunities have not been realized with the optimal success and extent. Our joint efforts must be increased in the future, their extent must be expanded, so that a larger number of students would find their way to art, would appreciate the importance of the arts in filling leisure time and in shaping the personality.

Last November the Students' Scientific Society was founded. The institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR and the schools of higher education of our republic have extended an understanding and helping hand to it, and we can expect that within the next years this common venture will shape in the young people clear understandings of scientific work, and increase their interest in a deeper investigation of one or another branch of science. The social idea of this work is the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

early development of scientific prerequisites in the young. A considerable and meaningful assistance to the schools is rendered by the children's programs of Estonian radio and television, as well as by its programs dealing with many other aspects of educational work. The newspapers of our republic have increased their attention to the problems of teaching the students communistically. It must be stated in appreciation that these articles are competent, they do not smooth over school problems; to the contrary, many of them raise very serious, still unresolved problems, drawing the attention of the concerned collectives, including the schools, to the solution of these problems. These materials clearly echo an attempt to formulate an objective and positive attitude in the evaluation of the schools' activities.

The management of the students' free time through the activity of the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol, the education of youth in the spirit of citizenship, international friendship and patriotism has always been the basis for cooperation between our ministry and the Central Committee of the Estonian Young Communist League.

The above has not been said to make our work easier. Our youth must experience the richness of cultural life and the experiences of the productive and social life of the older generation. In other words, it grows to social maturity in direct contacts with real life. Attempts to bring everything within school walls show a simplified picture of the school. In the conditions at hand schools together with other agencies must also be more skilled and imaginative in forming in the students social maturity.

The second complex of problems is directly concerned with the school itself, with its ideological-moral activity.

The ministry, together with the educational organs and the teaching staffs of the schools considers its moral obligation to be the shaping of a comprehensively developed personality in harmony with the requirements of the society by its training and educational work. Today, in the condition of developed socialism, the preparations of each young person's entry into the national economy calls for great expenditures by society. For example, almost 400 vocations in our country already call for secondary education or specialized vocational schooling. Consequently the schools, taking into account the expenses incurred by society, have to understand that in the preparation of a young person for life and work the idea expressed at the 26th Congress of the CPSU stating that "management must be economical" is very expressive and clear, being expressed here especially in a moral sense.

The above is closely connected with the content and extent of the general secondary educational program. These ideas reecho in the complex plans of our educational development and in the sponsorship agreements between schools, collectives and enterprises. It is appropriate for us to stress here that the understanding of a preparation for work and life must in turn derive from an approach free of formalism. In places one can detect a simplified approach, in that the students are given more and more concrete study and work assignments, without their mental and moral characteristics or emotions being developed to a higher level.

The requirement to improve the preparations for work and real life does not at all mean a weakening of the requirements imposed on the content and extent of education. Currently a reorganization of school management is underway to achieve a comprehensive development of the student in light of a perfected content and extent of teach-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ing. This presupposes that the teachers but also the students develop an appropriate state of mind, tie it organically to the daily educational activity; it presupposes a unity of word and deed, this being the guiding principle of moral education. There is no reason to doubt that the 14,000 members of the teaching body of our republic's general schools work in the interest of achieving ideological-moral maturity in the youth. Remarkable work is done at the 1st secondary school of Voru, at the Poltsamaa and Marjamaa secondary schools.

The work of the teachers of the 15th Tallinn and the 42d Tallinn im. L. Parn secondary schools in the implementation of a system of moral education in the curriculum are especially worthy of imitation.

The experiences of these and many other teachers show that /in boldface/ the mere offering of education and knowledge does not in itself result in moral convictions in the youth nor in an ability to behave morally in real life. The teacher's own moral activity and demanding attitude, as well as sensitivity is necessary to make the process of teaching the basics of knowledge a process of shaping the moral perfection of each student. /end boldface/ The 15th plenary meeting of the CC CPes, discussing the situation of the ideological-political work in our republic, requested that party and school organs incorporate into the educational life of our republic the experiences made by the Belorussian party organization in the moral education of the youth and in preparing the teachers accordingly.

Meeting the requests of the plenary meeting, a theoretical seminar for chiefs of the education departments and the school instructors of the town and rayon committees of the CPF was organized to discuss the questions of the students' ideological-moral education. The aims of the seminar were: The theoretical and methodological training of school and party personnel for directing this kind of work and for organizing it locally;

The study of work done in our republic in that field, the dissemination and implementation of the better results of such work.

The ultimate aim of the republic's seminar is the founding of similarly oriented theoretical and practical seminars for the chief educators and the secretaries of basic party units in all towns and rayons of the republic; at the same time it is important that methodological centers be established in every rayon and town.

What are the results of the first school year?

The following could be shown on the positive side:

Establishment of a firm conviction of a need for a system of moral education in the shaping of a young person in each participant of the seminar;

Directing the attention of the participants to the final aims of moral education and to the practical steps necessary to achieve it;

Establishment of a conviction that moral education is a key ingredient in the complex of communist education;

Internationalization of the experiences of fraternal republics and their incorporation into our educational praxis.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

During the seminar it also became apparent that:

our republic lacks a sufficient number of trained personnel;

there is a lack of germane Estonian literature, not only scholarly but also directed at the young, fathers and mothers;

the young teachers are insufficiently trained in directing the solving of moral education problems in schools according to the demands of the contemporary times;

because of years of neglect of such work our educational personnel is generally poorly prepared to carry out successful moral education in the schools, there is a lack of ability to see and formulate, consequently also to use the aims and methods and means necessary for moral education. For this reason the functional contacts between all the components of the educational process have been violated, there is no consistency in the shaping of the student's moral perfection in the educational process. In this condition it is hardly possible to talk of meeting the task assigned to the schools by V. I. Lenin at the 3d Congress of the Russian Young Communist League, that: "It is necessary that the training, educating and teaching of the entire contemporary youth be at the same time an education in communist morality." We still have a lot of fields to till.

Solving many of these problems does not depend on us alone. The directing and decisive activity of the leading organs of the republic is necessary. At the same time we can state with conviction that an increase in activity dealing with problems of moral education shows that there is obviously an opportunity to deal with them successfully. Our activity is pointed in that very direction.

Third. The buttressing of the ideological-moral education in a scientific-methodological way; activity in recruiting instructional staff.

Within the progress of modern science and technology the Soviet school system contributes markedly in paving the road to the development of society. The social function of the school has increased tremendously, as has its ideological role. The increase of the ideological conflict between two social systems has in turn raised serious demands regarding the training of the educational personnel and refreshing its training.

The decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the further improvement of ideological work and political education" required that our teachers-educators achieve an organic unity in education-training work, and perfect the shaping in the students of the high political-moral attributes of the communist world view.

To be able to master the socialist demands expected of him the teacher has to do more than ever before to retrain himself in every way. The teacher's helper in this task is the Institute for Continuing Education of the Republic's Teachers together with the methodological departments of the education departments. The principle of organic unity of teaching and education that has been the basis of the teacher's daily praxis has become the basis for working out the contents and methods of teachers' refresher courses. The training of the teacher for ideological-moral education begins in college, but research in all the pedagogical institutes of the USSR has shown that the level of knowledge of the basis of education (the pedagogical-psychological preparation) is lower than competency in subject fields and methodological areas.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The stages of educational refresher training in our republic take this into account, and the theory and methodology of educational questions are the largest subject areas in the courses. The problems of communist education are especially dominant in the first, educational stages of the course. The courses of this stage include mostly problems of Marxist-Leninist theory, the theory and methodology of education, education in the teaching process, the party and Komsomol activity in the school, work in and out of class, questions of education within the family, problems of the class director's work, etc. The main topic of the second state courses involves psychological problems. Thus in the course of continuing education the young specialist acquires sufficient knowledge of ideological-moral teaching.

The third level for imparting training in ideological-moral education consists of organizers and school directors. They attend regional and all-republican seminars, they are shown the experiences made in our republic and in other federal republics.

The teacher is generally receptive to help, direction and teaching, but there is still enough conservatism and routine in implementing the knowledge gained. Too often the student is regarded as an object of training in ideological-moral education. He is used in testing all kinds of possible and impossible ideas. The part of the student in thinking and carrying out this educational attempt has remained scanty. Our teachers sometimes do not even think of the person to whom the lesson or event is directed. In other words--the student is not regarded as the subject of educational work.

Modern education demands that colleges prepare young specialists who have been trained to the highest possible level in organizing the initiative and self-training of the student. The moral deviations of the students show clearly that there are serious deficiencies in that work. An analysis of school practice shows that these phenomena are to a large degree connected to a one-sided, i.e. authoritarian influence shown by the teacher. We cannot agree with such a formalistic interpretation of the teacher's role. Again and again we are directed to correct methodological positions by the most valuable achievements of Soviet education. First of all, let us pay attention to the method of parallel pedagogical activity, described by A. Makarenko and proven in his educational work. The teacher-educator and the children belong to the same collective. By living together with the students, by sharing their joys, sorrows and concerns the teacher brings his students up to socialist maturity. Such activity is designed to meet the task posed by the 26th Congress of the CPSU regarding fulfillment of the school's moral mission, i.e. to increase the ties between teaching and actual life and to improve the preparation of the students for a socially useful role. The ideological decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the decisions of the 26th Congress require that we switch from an informative training of the teaching body to a methodological one. The task is not easy, but life with its demands has put it before us in total focus. This, however, means that the continuing education of teachers must adopt more active methods. We are hoping for assistance from the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR and the institutes of higher education. No other institution can open the methodological and moral aspects of the various branches of learning to the teacher, of course him to adopt a new, investigative way of thinking.

In the interest of raising the teachers' level of ideological-moral knowledge it must be seriously investigated how the teacher's political and subject matter retaining can be united in a competent, organic, and successful way. We are convinced

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

that the comprehensive and competent solution of this problem helps us overcome those difficulties and shortcomings that occur in our schools in the field of ideological-moral training and in joining teaching and educating. Here an intensive and creative self-perfection of each teacher and educational worker is necessary so as to be able to deeply comprehend and fathom the ideological-moral content of the tasks posed by the 26th Congress of the CPSU and to find ways to meet them. A wait-and-see attitude is completely counterindicated.

Let us here try to fathom just one of these tasks--to raise the quality of teaching. The easiest way to interpret this task formalistically would be to compile another program of events. In the correct approach we are required to perceive the dialectical connections between real problems and the practical application of methodological expressions.

Let us then repeat the posed task of raising the quality of education. In our opinion the following processes become involved in the pursuit of that aim:

to formulate general and specific tasks of education on the basis of curricula;

to train students to acquire knowledge independently;

to shape the practical ability to apply knowledge (in school work, in socially useful work);

to organize a qualitative evaluation of the student's work.

Each of these real processes is influenced by a complex of factors. The first process listed by us is influenced by such factors as:

the teacher's qualification, his ability to comprehend and describe the concept of quality of knowledge (the depth, completeness, system, flexibility, adaptability, etc of his training);

the teacher's ability to formulate assignments and to evaluate the quality of their fulfillment;

the knowledge of the student body and its motivational sphere;

the condition of the material basis of education, etc.

From such factors we can derive concrete tasks for the teacher, the student, the school, and other areas; this is vital to implement the listed factors. From this approach we guarantee a uniform content and extent of each student's education, consequently also the acquisition and correct evaluation of the moral values of our society. The forms, methods and means for solving the tasks facing Soviet schools are varied, depending on the creative activity of the teacher, and also depending on the basic task we have--to educate a comprehensively developed personality.

During the last five-year plan the Institute for Scientific Study of Education also took marked interest in investigating the question of ideological-moral education, and the incorporation of these findings into practical schoolwork. One topic of the institute's research program concerns "the communist education of the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

students." The institute has paid great attention to effecting ideological education through some concrete subject or cluster of subjects. No subject has been exempted from research into the student's ideological education. This is necessitated by the fact that one important requirement in compiling any program of studies is its impact on ideological education.

Topics concerned with the students' communist education cannot be exhausted by the PTUI nor even by all the efforts of the researchers of our republic. We therefore hold that the rich experiences made across the country be adopted. The following topics are currently being adapted by the PTUI: The student's moral education in the comprehensive school; principles of internationalist education in teaching basic subjects; the students' ideological-aesthetical education. The list of topics is to be expanded in the future.

The communist education of members of the future society cannot be successful if the home does not participate. The PTUI scholars have therefore, in addition to other projects, attempted to investigate moral education in the family. During the last five-year plan PTUI scholars put together 4 compilations and one brochure for use by parents.

It is important that the existing, still relatively scarce ideological-methodological literature dealing with a student's moral education reach every teacher and be applied in his daily work at school.

The main task for the immediate future facing the Ministry of Education of the Estonian SSR and the organs of education is an application of the comprehensive education system and of each of its components in such a way that the educational requirements of the 26th Congress of the CPSU will be successfully met.

COPYRIGHT: Kirjastus "Periodika," "Noukogude Kool," 1981

9240

CSO: 1815/23

END